Persian Gulf
The Persian Gulf is a relatively small, shallow body of salt water which separates Iran on the northeast from the Arabian Peninsula on the southwest. Japan and thirty percent of that imported by Western European countries. The U.S. currently imports less than ten percent of its oil needs from the gulf area, but, this figure had been rising annually since 1980.5 Given the availability of oil on the market, the current market price and the relatively low recovery cost of Persian Gulf oil, U.S. preference for gulf oil will most likely continue to increase and could conceivably double over the next few years.
Western Security
A quick look at the relative dependence on gulf oil seems to indicate that the United States would lose little should the gulf oil market be disrupted or closed. Japan would be the biggest loser. Following that train of thought, one could argue that the United States, which possesses substantial oil reserves and access to Mexican and South American oil, might even benefit from an oil cut off, in so much as this would hike Japanese energy costs.
In fact, interruption of oil flow to Japan would have an inTnediate aoverse impact on the United States. As Japan lost its access to gulf oil, it would De forced to search elsewhere, thus bidding up the rice of oil available on the market. This would send prices in the U.S. sky-rocketing and the ensuing inflation would certainly damage the U.S. economy.
Given the close interrelatedness of the Western economic system, access to Persian Gulf oil is clearly a vital U.S. national interest.7 Moreover, U.S. economic interests in the gulf region extend beyond the area to include economic markets and available investment capital generated by the gulf oil industry. One can even argue that the economic health of the United States and its partners In the Western alliance Is crucially dependent on Saudi investment in their economies. Along with that the West benefits from diversification of the gulf oil states' ?etroleum Industry. Given this state of affairs, the conclusion is inescapable that the gulf, now and the foreseeable future, is an area of vital interest to the U.S. Production quotas and embargoes are often dismissed as non threatening given today's oil market. In January 1989, former U.S. Energy Secretary, John S. Herrington, stated publicly that he believed OPEC would continue to decline in Importance. The current oil glut and the tendency of the OPEC nations to over produce are cited In this connection.12 Many also believe that the need for oil revenues in Iran and Iraq will help to keep oil supplies high and prices low. 13 In the short term this may be true. However, a measure of caution must be applied before dismissing this situation as non-threatening.
ENDNOTES
The oil glut on today's market is due in part to actions taken by the Saudis to regain control of the market.
From 1973 to 1979, Saudi Arabia controlled the price of oil on the world market by establishing a 'marker' or premium price for Its Arabian light crude.14 OPEC members used the "marker' to negotiate a price for their oil.
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Over pricing and over production were kept in check by the Saudis. Oil consumers could avoid over pricing by drawing their requirements form the huge Saudi Arabian reserves. Demands in excess of OPEC quotas were also supplied from Saudi reserves.15 Despite the early success in manipulating oil prices, Saudl Arabia lost control of the market in 1979.16
Following the Islamic Revolution, Iran's oil production dropped by 3 to 4 million barrels a day.17 Saudi Arabia was unable to sustain production at a level required to supply world demand.18 As a result, oil prices began rising 
Threat of Hostilities
Perhaps the more likely near-term threat to Persian Gulf oil is disruption of flow as the result of hostilities directed at or between gulf oil producing states. Hostile acts could be directed at oil exports along transit routes such as the Persian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz sea lines of communications or pipelines. Or, they could be directed specifically at oil producing facilities.
Interdiction of Oil Exports at Sea
Interdiction of oil exports seems a likely objective in a military campaign against an oil producing gulf state. In mid 1987, 7.5 million barrels of the 9.5 million exported daily passed through the Strait of Hormuz.
Closing the strait at that time would have meant a 9% daily reduction in the oil available on the free market. Assuming gulf oil exports remain constant, planned pipeline construction could reverse these figures by 1998. 28 Much like railways, pipelines can be easily damaged by small covert operations. But, such damage could be quickly repaired. In response to hostilities, security could be stepped up and mobile repair teams could be employed to limit and repair the effects of damage. Even air attacks against pipelines would produce limited results. Compared to damages large scale air strike might cause to producing facilities, pipeline damage would seem insignificant.
Additionally, pipelines offer producers with diverse networks the option to limit pumping via a route which Is threatened as Iraq has done with the Syrian pipeline. Further, significant disruption of flow over a long period would require coordinated attack and large scale damage throughout the Persian Gulf pipeline network. This is not a likely event. Even If It were, the U.S.
could do very little to prevent it unless assistance was requested by the Arab Gulf States.
Destruction of Producing Facilities
The most significant threat to Persian Gulf oil lies In the ability of the major gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, to strike at one another's oil producing facilities. During recent years, these three states have made significant additions to their ballistic missile inventories and both Saudi Arabia and Iraq possess a credible tactical air capability. Despite the IranIraq cease fire, much hostility and tension remains In the region and these nations will probably add to their already large arsenals of weapons.
Iran can certainly build a case to support the need for additional arms. 
